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Renewable Energy, Emissions Trading, 
Policy Mix
Emissions trading and the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
are key elements of German and European energy and climate policy. However, some 
critics oppose a targeted promotion of renewable energy, arguing in particular that 
this is ineffective or even damaging in conjunction with European emissions trading. 
Yet upon closer examination, the coexistence of emissions trading and promotion 
of renewable energy is not only possible, it is essential—provided the interactions 
between them are taken into account. It would be a mistake to discontinue the pro-
motion of renewable energy. Quite to the contrary: A commitment to the continua-
tion and further development of subsidy measures is necessary so that renewable 
energy—alongside increased energy efficiency—can furnish the foundation for a 
sustainable energy supply. 
In the future, renewable energies such as biomass, hydro power, wind energy, solar 
energy, and geothermal energy will comprise a greater portion of the energy mix. 
Renewable energy helps to reduce the environmental impacts of energy use, as well 
as to conserve non-renewable resources. At the same time, it reduces supply and 
price risks associated with the importation of energy. As a growth industry with 
considerable export potential, the renewable-energies sector also offers opportuni-
ties for economic development and technological innovation.1 By replacing fossil 
fuels such as coal, renewable energy reduces greenhouse gas emissions and helps 
to curb global warming—particularly from a long-term perspective (see Figure). 
All in all, the increased deployment of renewable energy serves the perennial aims 
of energy policy: to ensure secure, clean, and cost-efficient energy supplies. 
Many countries provide political support for the expanded use of renewable en-
ergy. For this support to be successful, initiatives to encourage R&D are required 
alongside effective policy instruments to promote the broad adoption of new energy 
technologies. Promotion measures allow sustainable markets for new technologies 
1 See German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi): Konjunkturgerechte Wachstumspolitik. Jahres-
wirtschaftsbericht 2009. Berlin, January 2009, particularly items 73, 77, and 78. According to this report, in Germany 
renewable energies helped to reduce CO2 emissions by approx. 110 million tons in 2007; this was equivalent to approx. 
13% of all CO2 emissions. See also German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety (BMU): Erneuerbare Energien in Zahlen. Nationale und internationale Entwicklung. December 2008.Emissions Trading and Promotion of Renewable Energy
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to develop while costs are steadily reduced.2 Only 
in this way can new energy technologies be suc-
cessfully deployed in the near future. 
Yet opposition to the targeted promotion of renew-
able energy has recently gained ground, particularly 
among economists.3 The view is often expressed that 
promotion of renewable energy is ineffective or even 
damaging when combined with European emissions 
trading. The proponents of this argument, however, 
overlook key factors with regard to energy, climate, 
and technology policy while drawing wide-reaching 
economic and environmental conclusions from sim-
plified economic models. When various energy and 
environmental policy instruments are implemented 
at the same time, the interaction effects between 
them must naturally be taken into account. Yet an 
evaluation of their effects should not be confined to 
static assessments, isolated impact analyses, or the 
comparison of textbook scenarios rather than real 
political options.
Ambitious Goals Should Be Preserved
In March of 2007, the European Council passed a 
resolution calling for renewable energy to comprise 
20% of Europe’s total final energy consumption by 
2020. In December of 2008, under its directive for 
the promotion of renewable energy, the EU set tar-
gets for each member state according to feasibility 
and the fair distribution of burdens. An overall target 
of 18% by 2020 was set for Germany. To achieve 
this target, 14% of heating energy and at least 30% 
of electricity generation are to come from renewable 
resources by 2020. These targets, which were fixed 
in law at the end of 2008 under the German govern-
ment‘s “Integrated Energy and Climate Program” 
(EEWärmeG, EEG-Novelle), should be rigorously 
pursued.4
Specific Promotion Instruments Are 
Necessary
In general, renewable energy can be promoted with 
broad-based environmental policy instruments (such 
as emissions trading and taxes) or special policy 
instruments focused on specific technologies. To 
date, broad-based policy instruments have done 
little to promote renewable energy. The European 
2 See Diekmann, J., C. Kemfert: Erneuerbare Energien: Weitere Förde-
rung aus Klimaschutzgründen unverzichtbar, DIW Berlin Wochenbericht 
No. 29/2005.
3 See, for example, Blankart, C. B. et al.: Die Energie-Lüge, in: Cicero 
12/2008, pp. 94-95.
4 In addition, at least 12% of all vehicle fuel on the market must be bio-
fuel (the so-called “biofuel quota”).
emissions trading system increases the price of elec-
tricity generated from fossil fuels between 1 and 
2 euro cents/kWh.5 In this way, emissions trading 
alone—without additional support—cannot in most 
cases make electricity generated from renewable 
resources profitable for private investors. 
Germany’s ecological tax reform, which went 
into effect in 1999, has generally improved the 
profitablility of renewable energy—for example, 
in the heating sector. Yet it has not improved the 
situation in the electricity market, as the standard 
eco-tax of 2.05 euro cents per kWh is also levied 
on electricity from renewable resources. Germany 
does, however, have a tool to effectively promote 
electricity from renewable resources in the form of 
technology-specific feed-in tariffs of the Renewable 
Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, 
or EEG). Similar provisions have also been enacted 
in most EU member states. 
Emissions Trading Still Far From 
Ideal
While the trading of emissions allowances is theo-
retically an ideal solution for limiting emissions, 
in order for the system to work effectively, emis-
sion limits, or caps, must be defined appropriately, 
emissions allowances must be allocated without 
distortion, and trading must provide the necessary 
5 At the current certificate price of ten euros per ton of CO2, this price 
effect is probably just under 1 euro cent per kWh.
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flexibility so that the marginal abatement costs can 
be balanced among regions, industries, and emitters 
to ensure overall abatement costs are minimized. 
The European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), 
introduced in 2003, is now a central element of 
Europe’s climate protection policy.
This system has been far from an ideal model, par-
ticularly in the first trading period from 2005 to 
2007, but also in the second trading period, which 
began in 2008 and will end in 2012.6 Conceptually, 
the system has been restricted to certain branches 
(segments of the energy and industrial sectors), gas-
es (essentially just CO2), and regionally to Europe. 
In this way, coordination with excluded sectors is 
necessary. The allocation of emissions allowances 
through National Allocation Plans (NAPs) has—as a 
result of political processes, the strong influence of 
lobbyists, and an initially insufficient data basis—
lead to complex rules, distorted incentives, and ex-
cessively generous emission limits.7 Intervention 
by the European Commission has been necessary to 
ensure the effectiveness of the system and sufficient 
consistency. Following a review of the system (ETS 
Review), serious changes were agreed upon and will 
be implemented with the start of the third trading 
period in 2013, including a longer trading period, 
increased auctioning, and the establishment of an 
EU-wide cap. In this connection, changes have not 
been implemented piecemeal, but rather consis-
tently and in a single package. This is particularly 
true with regard to the newly implemented directive 
regarding renewable energy as well as the decision 
on effort sharing in sectors currently not covered by 
the emissions trading system. With these changes, 
the aim is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
2020 in Europe to 20% or 30% below their 1990 
levels, depending on the result of international ne-
gotiations. 
Renewable Energies Curb Demand 
for Emission Certificates
The main interaction between emissions trading 
and the specific promotion of renewable energy is 
the result of a substitutional effect: the generation 
of electricity from renewable sources reduces fossil 
6  Kemfert, C., J. Diekmann: Europäischer Emissionshandel—Auf dem 
Weg zu einem effizienten Klimaschutzinstrument, DIW Berlin Wochenbe-
richt No. 46/2006; Kemfert, C.: Versteigern statt Verschenken! Warum 
es sinnvoll ist, eine vollständige Versteigerung der Emissionsrechte an-
zustreben, in: Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung, 18 (2007), 
1, pp. 9-17.
7  DIW, Institute for Applied Ecology, Fraunhofer ISI: Entwicklung eines 
nationalen Allokationsplans im Rahmen des EU-Emissionshandels, UBA 
texts 17/07. Berlin 2007. Diekmann, J., J. Schleich: Auktionierung von 
Emissionsrechten—Eine Chance für mehr Gerechtigkeit und Effizienz im 
Emissionshandel, in: Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 30 (2006), 4, pp. 
259-266.
fuel consumption, thus lowering the demand from 
power plant operators for emission certificates.8 The 
total amount of emissions allowances (the cap) must 
therefore be reduced. If this is not done, the result 
is lowered CO2 prices and the displacement of CO2 
emissions to other European countries or economic 
sectors. This, in turn, could seriously impair the 
environmental effectiveness of the combined use 
of emissions trading and the promotion of renew-
able energy. 
Potentially negative interaction effects can be re-
duced by opening up the trading system—for ex-
ample, by incorporating international credit systems 
such as the Clean Development Mechanism from 
the Kyoto Protocol—yet they cannot be fully elimi-
nated. CO2 abatement projects in other countries 
would be unavoidably impaired as a consequence. 
In this case, as well, cap levels must be coordinated 
with policies that promote the adoption of renew-
able energy.
Policy Coordination is Key
A lack of coordination between emissions trading 
and the promotion of renewable energy can produce 
negative effects if the emission reductions achieved 
with renewable energy are not properly anticipated 
in the setting of emission caps. Even in this case, 
however, it is unjustified to conclude that promotion 
of renewable energy is ineffective. One could, by 
the same token, argue that emissions trading is inef-
fective. Yet mutual accusations of ineffectiveness 
are of no assistance when both policy instruments 
are deployed in unison. Efforts to achieve policy 
coordination are instead required, in order to assure 
that the best possible overall effect is obtained. This 
also applies to the interaction between emissions 
trading and other policy measures—for example, 
those aimed at reducing electricity consumption. 
If one is to adequately assess policies for the pro-
motion of renewable energy, it is also necessary to 
understand that the danger of insufficient coordina-
8 For an analysis of the interaction effects between emissions trading 
and other policy instruments, see Sorrel, S., J. Sijm: Carbon Trading in the 
Policy Mix, in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy 19 (2003), 3, pp. 420-
437. Río González, P. d.: The Interaction Between Emissons Trading and 
Renewable Electricity Support Schemes: An Overview of the Literature, 
in: Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 12 (2007), 
8, pp. 1363-1390. Diekmann, J., M. Horn: Analyse und Bewertung des 
EEG  im  Zusammenhang  mit  anderen  Instrumenten  des  Klima-,  Um-
welt- und Ressourcenschutzes, in: DIW, DLR, ZSW, IZES: Wirkungen des 
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes (EEG) aus gesamtwirtschaftlicher Sicht. 
Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit, Berlin 2008 ; English summary: DIW, DLR, ZSW, IZES: 
Economic Analysis and Evaluation of the Effects of the Renewable En-
ergy Act. Study on Behalf of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Berlin 2008 (download: www.
erneuerbare-energien.de/inhalt/41491/40870/).Emissions Trading and Promotion of Renewable Energy
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tion between emissions trading and promotion of 
renewable energy exists irrespective of the type of 
promotion policy and is therefore not solely inherent 
to the German Renewable Energy Sources Act. For 
example, it is also necessary under a quota system 
with tradable green certificates—such as that in 
the UK—to take emission reductions into account 
when calculating cap levels. Experience in the UK 
shows that the forecast risks under such a system 
are not any lower than under Germany’s Renewable 
Energy Sources Act.   
Varied Interaction Effects in 
Different Trading Periods
A distinction must be drawn between each trad-
ing period when evaluating the interaction between 
emissions trading and the promotion of renewable 
energy. 
First Trading Period: Emissions Trading 
Only Effective to a Limited Extent
The first trading period was conceptualized as a 
learning phase. It revealed a number of deficiencies 
in the Emissions Trading System (ETS) and National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs). The overall system was 
only effective to a limited extent due to excessively 
high national caps. Numerous special regulations 
that varied from country to country for cost-free 
allocation  also  led  to  unintended  distortions.9 
Cornerstones—for example, those of the German 
NAP I—were eventually established in a political 
compromise. In defining the cap, the forecasted 
expansion of renewable energy between the baseline 
period (2000-2002) and the end of the trading period 
(in 2007) was not sufficiently taken into account. 
Yet regardless of this fact, the cap levels were far 
too high. Most member states did little to heed the 
guidance on allocation plans from the Commission. 
According to estimates by the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW Berlin), the growth in 
renewable electricity generation stimulated by the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act may have resulted in 
a CO2 price reduction of approximately one euro per 
ton.10 Prices on the CO2 market were very volatile 
between 2005 and 2006, however, ranging between 
9  See DIW, Institute for Applied Ecology, Fraunhofer ISI: Wirkungsana-
lysen des Emissionshandels in der ersten Handelsperiode (2005–2007) 
sind mit erheblichen Unsicherheiten behaftet. See also: Ellerman, A. D., 
B. Buchner: Over-Allocation or Abatement: A Preliminary Analysis of the 
EU ETS based on the 2005-06 Emissions Data, in: Environmental and Re-
source Economics 41, 2, 2008, 267–287; Ellerman, A. D., S. Feilhauer: A 
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Look at Emissions Abatement in Germany in 
Response to the EU ETS. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Re-
search (CEEPR), 08-017, November 2008; Deutsche Emissionshandels-
stelle (DEHSt) im Umweltbundesamt: Emissionshandel: Auswertung der 
ersten Handelsperiode. Berlin 2009.
10 See Diekmann, J., M. Horn, l.c.
10 and 30 euros per ton. In 2007 the spot market 
for CO2 certificates virtually collapsed, with prices 
below one euro. For this reason it is doubtful that 
emission reductions achieved under the Renewable 
Energy Sources Act resulted even in a partial dis-
placement of emissions to other economic sectors 
during the first trading period, particularly consid-
ering that a large number of emissions rights were 
cancelled unused.
Second Trading Period: Improvements 
Lead to Increased Effectiveness
In the run-up to the second trading period, as well, 
the German National Allocation Plan (NAP II, June 
2006) was not drafted to explicitly take emission 
reductions resulting from the increased use of re-
newable energy into account. To the extent that its 
quantity structure was based on the approach in 
the NAP I, forecasted CO2 reductions from renew-
able energy were largely ignored, despite the fact 
that implicit allowances were made to account for 
emission increases resulting from the declining use 
of nuclear energy. Following formal notification 
of the plan, the European Commission, which had 
only approved Germany’s NAP II on the condition 
that drastic changes be made, called for even more 
serious amendments. The annual emissions cap was 
ultimately set at a level much lower than in the first 
trading period. The caps were also reduced further 
for other member states. The repeated over-alloca-
tion of emissions rights was thus avoided—even 
when expanded power generation from renewable 
sources is taken into account. In 2001 the EU issued 
a directive with targets for the generation of electric-
ity from renewable resources by 2010. A target of 
22% of gross electricity production was set, a figure 
that includes new EU member states. Even if it is 
likely that these targets won’t be fully reached, they 
can be used as a forecast. In this way, it cannot be 
assumed that the promotion of renewable energy 
will lead to a systematic impairment of emissions 
trading in the second trading period. 
Third Trading Period: EU-Wide 
Coordination of Emissions Trading and 
the Promotion of Renewable Energy
In the third trading period, the interaction effects 
will differ as a consequence of fundamental modi-
fications to the Emissions Trading System, in par-
ticular the centralized coordination of an EU-wide 
ETS cap (for the EU as a whole: -21% compared 
to 2005, instead of 27 separate national caps) with 
national abatement targets for the non-ETS sectors 
and ambitious targets for renewable energy (20% of 
total final energy consumption). While the consis-
tency of these elements has been reviewed by the Emissions Trading and Promotion of Renewable Energy
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EU in its assessment report,11 some uncertainties 
remain. For example, the precise extent to which 
the member states will fulfill the overall targets for 
the use of renewable energy in the electricity or 
heating sectors is not clear. This allocation will first 
take place in the middle of 2010 once the member 
states have presented their national action plans for 
the development of renewable energies. Unintended 
price-lowering effects on the CO2 market will only 
be triggered, however, to the extent that the actual 
emissions reductions achieved with renewable elec-
tricity exceed the anticipated reduction amounts. 
Yet regardless of the outcome in this connection, 
European emissions trading is subject to a number 
of future uncertainties. The setting of more aggres-
sive abatement targets depending on the results of 
international negotiations is one prime example.   
In this regard, the European strategy to ambitious-
ly expand its use of renewable energy—alongside 
emissions trading—can be seen as a political signal 
with which the EU can solicit trust for cooperative 
efforts to address international climate protection. 
Here, as well, there is no contradiction between 
emissions trading and the promotion of renewable 
energy. 
The Renewable Energy Sources 
Act is a Necessary Instrument for 
Promoting Renewable Energy
In order for the EU’s targets to be attained, the 
promotion of renewable energy is needed along-
side an emissions trading system. The basic model 
furnished by the Renewable Energy Sources Act 
has proven its worth. This is particularly true with 
regard to the effectiveness of its minimum feed-in 
tariffs and the high investment security afforded 
by its purchase guarantees. The Act also fares well 
in an international comparison of similar policies. 
The Act’s varied tariffs enable the introduction of 
cutting-edge technologies—such as offshore wind 
parks—while avoiding undesired high profits in 
other areas. The gradually declining feed-in tariffs 
(degression) provided under the Act send a clear 
signal to market participants that cost reductions are 
necessary (particularly with regard to the oft-debated 
high feed-in tariffs for photovoltaic electricity). In 
addition, the undesired burdening of individual elec-
tric supply companies and energy-intensive firms is 
for the most part avoided (thanks to a nationwide 
equalization scheme and special hardship provi-
11  Commission of the European Communities: Annex to the Impact 
Assessment. Document accompanying the Package of implementation 
measures for the EU’s objectives on climate change and renewable ener-
gy for 2020. Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 85, Vol. 
II, Brussels, 27. Feb. 2008.
sions, respectively). The financial burden borne by 
electricity consumers not privileged under the Act is 
approximately one euro cent per kWh. This burden 
will initially increase as the use of renewable en-
ergy is expanded, but will fall in a few years as the 
cost differential declines and more power producers 
wean themselves from the promotion scheme. This 
process will be supported by the emissions trading 
system, which will play an increasingly important 
role over the mid- to long-term in determining the 
competitiveness of renewable energies. 
Alongside the necessary cost reductions, a key chal-
lenge at present is the need to improve the integra-
tion of renewable electricity into the power grid 
and markets. First, there are problems associated 
with the rapidly increasing share of electricity from 
fluctuating sources of supply (particularly wind en-
ergy). This has a number of effects on the electricity 
grid and other power stations. Second, it would be 
expedient—irrespective of the first point—to create 
increasing incentives for the more demand-oriented 
provisioning and marketing of electricity. Modified 
promotion provisions could create greater risks—but 
also greater opportunities—for power plant opera-
tors and future investors. Improved support schemes 
can also help to make new green energy technolo-
gies commercially viable as early as possible. 
Conclusion
There are many good reasons for the increased use of 
renewable energy. It limits environmental impacts, 
conserves non-renewable resources, and decreases 
energy-supply risks. As these external benefits have 
not been taken sufficiently into account in market 
prices up to now, government efforts to promote 
R&D as well as the market for renewable energy 
are, as a rule, justified. In addition, investment in 
renewable energy is creating a growth branch with 
considerable export potential. Promotion policies 
accelerate technological innovations and their adop-
tion. They also induce cost reductions that improve 
the economic efficiency of energy supply over the 
mid- to long-term. 
Renewable energies are increasingly replacing fossil 
fuels and are thus making a significant contribution 
to minimizing the emission of greenhouse gases such 
as CO2. Some critics, however, reject the targeted 
promotion of renewable energy by claiming that it 
is incompatible with European emissions trading. 
They justify this argument on the grounds that, with 
emission caps in place, the promotion of renewable 
energies merely lead to lower CO2 certificate prices 
and the displacement of emissions. On the one hand, 
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previous effectiveness of European emissions trading. On the other, the possibility 
of coordinating emissions trading and the promotion of renewable energy in an ex-
pedient manner—particularly with regard to the setting of goals—is underestimated. 
Yet the coordination of policy instruments lies at the very heart of the integrated 
energy and climate policy pursued at the national and European level. As long as 
anticipated CO2 reductions from renewable energy are taken into account in the 
determination of emissions caps, undesired displacement effects can be avoided. 
In this way, the argument that the promotion of renewable energy is ineffective for 
climate policy is rendered groundless. In any event, the current support for renew-
able energy is also improving future opportunities for climate protection, thanks 
to the practical experience gained. 
The use of renewable energy must be promoted not only in the electricity sector, but 
also in the transportation and heating sectors. Furthermore, it is essential to improve 
the efficiency of energy conversion while encouraging greater conservation among 
consumers. These goals continue to require a mix of energy and environmental 
policy instruments that are coordinated at a national and international level—of 
which emissions trading forms one part. 